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ABSTRACT 
 This research addresses the decreasing worth of the Servicemembers’ Group Life 
Insurance (SGLI) payout based on the year a servicemember dies. The SGLI maximum 
has stagnated at $400,000 for over 16 years and nearly every other servicemember 
entitlement or benefit has increased in this timeframe. Using four principal steps, this 
research first determines what the SGLI maximum should be using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression and compounding inflation rates. Second, it conducts trend analysis to 
determine statistically significant predictors of servicemember death trends and forecasts 
servicemember deaths, end strengths, and inflation rates for ex post analysis. Third, it 
determines the feasibility of the proposed increases using historical 
payout-to-contribution ratios to determine sustainable contribution rates for monthly 
premiums. Fourth, it discusses alternatives to still provide benefit to servicemembers and 
beneficiaries, regardless of policy change. 
 The ultimate recommendation is to increase the SGLI maximum to $525,000 in 
2021, then continue to increase at 5-year intervals to correct for inflation, ultimately 
increasing to $605,000 in 2041 at which point it can be reassessed or have the interval 
increases continue. 
 With a 95 percent confidence interval, the models predicted between 757 and 
2,596 annual servicemember deaths; total service end strengths between 798,529 and 
2,300,810; and inflation rates between 0.44 and 5.56 percent until 2041. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
For years, individual colonies provided compensation to families of 
servicemembers who died in frontier warfare because the Continental Congress lacked both 
real executive power and funding. It was not until the act of September 29, 1789 that social 
insurance protection began on the federal level. As time passed, policies evolved to better 
recompense servicemember sacrifices. Unfortunately, such reforms were not always 
ratified in a timely fashion, sometimes taking decades post-conflict for entitlements to be 
fulfilled and death gratuities to be paid to the deserving beneficiaries (Aaronson, 1942). 
The current iteration of group life insurance for military members is the 
Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (SGLI). Originally approved by Congress in 1965 
under public law 89–214, through the concerted efforts of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) and Prudential Financial Incorporated (Prudential); beneficiaries of 
servicemembers who died of a service connected death became entitled to up to $10,000 
(Social Security Administration [SSA], 1966), which equates to roughly $82,779 in 2021 
dollars (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], n.d.). Premium rates were $1 a 
month for every $5,000 worth of coverage. Servicemembers who desired extra coverage 
were free to purchase additional life insurance from commercial providers. Supplemental 
options still exist today, but similar to that era, many providers add clauses exempting 
hostilities or deaths commonly associated with military service (SSA, 1966). 
As shown in Figure 1, the SGLI maximum amount increased roughly every 5 years 
since its 1965 inception. In September 2005, the amount increased by an unprecedented 
$150,000 but has stagnated since. Contribution rates have ranged between $0.06 and $0.07 
per $1,000 since 2005, with no change to the actual maximum amount (Callan et al., 2011). 
Using the consumer price index to argue buying power, $400,000 in September 2005 had 
the same buying power as $526,322 in January 2021, and $400,000 in January 2021 had 
the same buying power as $303,996 in September 2005 (BLS, n.d.). 
2 
 
Figure 1. SGLI Maximum Amounts per Year (1965–2021).  
Adapted from Callan et al. (2011). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The ultimate goal of this research is to address the decreasing worth of the SGLI 
payout based on the year a servicemember dies and to ultimately increase the maximum 
amount authorized through the SGLI program through an initial correction and then 
increase at subsequent regular intervals. The maximum option should not stagnate for 16 
years. The basic concept of inflation devalues an unchanging amount with each passing 
year. To determine a feasible solution to this problem, I organized the research into four 
principal steps. Figure 2 illustrates my intent to first, determine what the SGLI maximum 
should be based on multiple analyses. Second, conduct trend analysis to evaluate several 
factors and determine statistically significant predictors of servicemember deaths. Third, 
determine the feasibility of proposed SGLI maximum increases compared to historical 
contribution and payout ratios. Fourth, discuss alternatives to the proposals made. 
3 
 
Figure 2. The Four Principal Steps Used to Analyze an 
Increase to the SGLI Maximum. 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction with 
background information. Chapter II establishes conceptual framework with a literature 
review. Chapter III discusses the data used with descriptive statistics using the four 
principle steps. Chapter IV addresses the analytical methods used for the four principle 
steps. Chapter V discusses the results of each principle step and Chapter VI discusses 
conclusions and policy recommendations. Appendices A, B, C, and D provide more in-
depth information about data, methods, and analyses from chapters III and IV. 
This is not a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) analyzing every facet of the SGLI 
program. In the military, leaders are taught to have proposed solutions when a problem is 
identified. This thesis provides solutions. 
C. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE AND CURRENT POLICIES 
Since 2005, nearly every other major benefit or allowance for servicemembers have 
increased. Base pay, basic allowance for housing (BAH), and basic allowance for 
sustenance (BAS) change annually to account for inflation and other factors (Henig, 2010). 
They do not always match inflation, but increasing at regular intervals avoids significant 
disparities between the received entitlements and the actual costs of goods and services. 
The G.I. Bill and servicemember retirement plans also have changed since 2005. 
Figure 3 shows the historical SGLI maximum values with regard to historical 
inflation rates from fiscal years 1965 to 2021. The navy-blue dots represent historical 
4 
maximum values. The green line shows what the interim values would have been if they 
followed inflation between increases. In years there was a maximum increase, the green 
line indicates the continuation of the inflation adjustment of the previous year’s maximum. 
The year following a maximum increase, the green line shows the amount of the recent 
increase, plus the inflation addition to the new maximum compounded until the next 
increase. The gold line indicates what the SGLI would have been, had it simply followed 
inflation since its inception in 1965 for $10,000. Every increase of the SGLI exceeded the 
inflation corrected values at the time of the increase, with the exception of 1981 where the 
increase lagged inflation by $2,337. To be fair, the inflation rates between 1974 and 1981 
were notably large at 12.3, 6.9, 4.9, 6.7, 9.0, 13.3, 12.5 and 8.9 percent, respectively. 
(Amadeo, 2020; Callan et al., 2011). I am not looking to implement a complete overhaul 
of the SGLI policy and its governing doctrine.  
 
Figure 3. SGLI Values Considering Inflation. Adapted from Amadeo (2020); 
Callan et al. (2011). 
Death is not a topic people are eager to discuss. While there exist articles that 
examine the value of a statistical life (VSL), the findings vary greatly and most end up 
using factors such as occupational hazards and or levels of education to determine “values.” 
The SGLI disbursement does not vary by occupational specialty. It does not change based 
5 
on branch of service. Under the SGLI, an administrative officer may select the same 
amount of coverage as a junior-enlisted infantryman sent into the line of fire (United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs [VA], n.d.). However, with the Honoring Every 
Requirement of Exemplary Service (HEROES) Act of 2005, servicemembers serving in 
combat or other specifically designated hostile zones have their montly SGLI premiums 
subsidized through active duty pay appropriations (S. Resolution 77, 2005). This saves the 
servicemember less than $30 per month (VA, n.d.). 
I am not looking to change this stipulation. Hazard pay and other benefits similarly 
compensate for such risks incurred during operational deployments and duty assignments. 
I am framing the compensation argument with sole focus on the SGLI maximum. I am 
underscoring the fact that the officer or junior enlistee’s beneficiaries could have paid off 
a median single-family home in San Diego, CA, with $400,000 had the servicemember 
died before 2011, but not after (Los Angeles Almanac, n.d.). Nevertheless, inflation 
continues to drive up the value of goods and services, leaving surviving beneficiaries to 
figure out the imposed difference. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS SUMMARY 
1. Step One: Determine What the SGLI Maximum Should Be 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the historical maximum amounts 
and other analyses using inflation rates, I determined a reasonable new SGLI maximum for 
2021 to be the consumer price index (CPI) corrected amount of $525,000, with an 
automatic increase to offset the inflation gap every 5 years. This amount will be rounded 
down to the nearest $5,000 to create a more conservative approach to change, while 
resolving the issue of future stagnation. 
2. Step Two: Trend Analysis 
To determine the feasibility of $525,000 and the subsequent incremental increases, 
it required forecasting servicemember death trends to anticipate potential surges. 
Therefore, using factors from 1980 to 2020, I compared total servicemember deaths to total 
servicemember end strengths as well as the political party affiliation of government 
6 
leadership.1 The results provided no arguably reliable statistically significant predictors of 
drastic fluctuations in servicemember deaths. 
To create the estimated values for ex post analyses, I used data from 1980 to 2020 
with auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) modeling, to forecast total 
annual servicemember deaths from 2021 to 2041 via time series analysis and data splitting. 
My model predicted between 757 and 2,596 servicemembers will die each year until 2041, 
representing a 95 percent confidence interval. The forecasted predicted values are more 
precisely estimated at 1,677 deaths annually. Based on recent trends, I would estimate the 
average total to be less than 1,000. There have not been more than 1,600 annual deaths 
since 2007. However, I used the predicted values as a conservative estimate for my analysis 
(Defense Manpower Data Center [DMDC], 2021b). 
For servicemember end strength, I used JMP2 time series forecasting in lieu of 
ARIMA modeling since no models would sufficiently validate. This predicted end 
strengths between 798,529 and 2,300,810 until 2041, representing a 95 percent confidence 
interval. The forecasted end strength is more precisely estimated between 1,493,721 and 
1,549,669, assuming similar trends of those between 1980 to 2020 (DMDC, 2021b). 
3. Step Three: Feasibility Determination 
To determine the feasibility of $525,000 and the subsequent forecasted increases, I 
focused on debt-to-income ratios of historical servicemember deaths3 against the historical 
weighted average contributions of those who elected for the SGLI4 (United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs [VA], 2020b). I then used the predicted deaths and 
predicted servicemember end strengths to compare the payout to contribution ratios from 
 
1 Political party affiliation being the political parties of the President, House Majority, and Senate 
Majority. 
2 JMP is a statistical software commonly referred to as “jump.” 
3 Assuming conservatively that every deceased servicemember opted for the maximum SGLI for the 
given timeframe, thus receiving the maximum payout. 
4 Of those eligible for the SGLI, an average of 96.9 percent of servicemembers opted for the SGLI 
between 2006 and 2019. Of that 96.9 percent, an average of 89.6 percent opted for the maximum amount 
and 10.4 percent opted for an amount between $50,000 and $350,000 (VA, 2020b). 
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1980 to 2041.5 Looking solely at the specified ratios of the maximum SGLI amounts and 
not factoring in any gains or losses of Prudential’s investments, I then used Microsoft Excel 
Solver to generate contribution amounts that would equate to the same ratios as previous 
years.6 The proposed increased maximums would require a conservative contribution rate 
raise from the current 2021 rate of $0.06 to $0.072, up to $0.102 in 2041 for every $1,000 
worth of coverage desired to maintain the 1980 to 2020 ratio. Using the 2005 to 2020 ratio 
would require contribution rates between $0.061 and $0.085 between 2021 and 2041 (BLS, 
n.d; Callan et al., 2011; DMDC, 2021b; VA, 2020b). 
Historically, the individual rates exceeded $0.102 between 1965 through 1983. 
However, even with high contribution rates, the total monthly premiums maxed out at 
$5.25 during this timeframe for a $35,000 policy in 1981. With my proposed 5-year 
increases, the monthly contributions for the increased maximums would range between 
$32.08 and $79.06 through 2041 if using the 2005 to 2020 ratio and $33.67 to $94.76 for 
the 1980 to 2020 ratio (BLS, n.d; Callan et al., 2011; DMDC, 2021b; VA, 2020b). 
4. Step Four: Discuss Alternatives 
The OLS analysis estimates a lower 2021-corrected maximum value and increases 
at a slower rate than my other two calculated increases. This also means it will track below 
expected inflation rates (BLS, n.d; Callan et al., 2011; DMDC, 2021b; VA, 2020b). 
However, if this course of action is selected, any amount of increase would still be better 
than the status quo. 
If Prudential increased their premiums, servicemembers might end up  paying more 
than premiums offered through alternative life insurance providers (Navy Mutual, 2021). 
However, staying solely with Prudential would minimize effort and streamline the process 
to maintain a known trusted provider for servicemembers. By seeking a complete policy 
shift or just a top-off from an alternate provider, the servicemember could save money, but 
be faced with potential clauses, medical evaluations, or other protocols and red tape. 
 
5 Combat duty subsidies are not factored into the calculations (S. Resolution 77, 2005). 
6 The payout to contribution ratios averaged 1.071 between 1980 and 2020 and 1.289 between 2005 
and 2020 (BLS, n.d; Callan et al., 2011; DMDC, 2021b; VA, 2020b). 
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Regardless of whether Prudential or any other policymaker completely rejects the 
proposal to increase the SGLI, I recommend at the very least, educating servicemembers 
in a more effective manner. By stating facts, servicemembers would be presented with 
factors to consider when determining the necessity of supplemental life insurance such as 
home prices, support networks, and the general duration of sustainability under loss of the 
servicemember’s income. Tables, figures, and discussions throughout this thesis lay out 
items of comparison to the SGLI’s worth. Showing a servicemember the trends of housing 
prices and time series graphs of inflation is far more effective than sending an email stating: 
“update your SGLI and make sure you are adequately covered.” There are only so many 
hours in a day and servicemembers already face doing more with less. I recommend against 
imposing coercion or bias. I do however, recommend providing a better baseline and 
enabling time to think about needs vice speeding through the process of validation and 
verification to satisfy a command compliance tracker. 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
This research is a legitimate attempt to help others. I have personally sought out 
supplemental life insurance to suit my family’s needs, but in my opinion, this should not 
be the solution to the lack of policymakers’ action over 16 years. I hope to educate others: 
policymakers and servicemembers alike, on the empirical reality of the status quo; raising 
awareness of what it is and what it should be. This is to help inform those who do not know 
what they do not know. 
The propensity to enlist depends on a lot of factors. Recruiters appeal to patriotism 
and nationalism, but if people do not feel valued, they will be less willing to accept the 
risk. By increasing the amount payable to a servicemember’s beneficiaries upon ultimate 
sacrifice, it at least acknowledges and better monetizes the gratitude for their service.  
Now while many believe it poor taste to put a monetary value to a person’s life, this 
is the essence of life insurance programs. To put it candidly, by not changing the “value” 
of a servicemember’s life, it gives the impression that policymakers do not “value” 
servicemembers’ sacrifices; and by accepting the stagnated $400,000, servicemembers 
accept that their life is worth less with each passing year.  
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
Notwithstanding the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the armed 
services have struggled to recruit and retain qualified personnel. Every day, each branch 
seeks to prevent a servicemember deficit by increasing the propensity to serve. Having 
spent time within Navy recruiting and holding genuine conversations with peers and 
colleagues, I noticed a recurring pattern. Many who chose to either not join a uniformed 
service or not “stay in,” did so because they felt viewed as “disposable,” or that they were 
“just another number” to the government. 
I was in high school on September 11, 2001. Many of my peers joined to defend 
our country, willing to give their life for the United States out of pure patriotism. I, 
however, did not enlist until 2006, and while it was for other reasons, I still acknowledged 
I was willing to die for the cause. While I knew people who knew people who had died in 
the line of duty, I never experienced a loss from my own command until I had served over 
10 years. He was a single Sailor who was barely two years into his naval career as an 
officer. At my subsequent command, I helped plan another memorial service for an enlisted 
Sailor who, on the weekend before his death, had married the 19-year-old woman who was 
7 months pregnant with his child. Fortunately, he had updated his paperwork two days after 
the wedding. Among these tragedies, I was confident the Sailors’ life insurance policies 
would provide adequate compensation to those who suffered such unexpected losses of 
their loved ones. 
When people join the military, they are indoctrinated with brief after brief regarding 
militarization and all the policies associated therein. Briefs range from uniform wear, to 
service history to education benefits, banking, and different types of insurance. 
Consequently, this indoctrination style is flawed because much of the information is 
directive and provided in such a dry and general context that the audience fails to retain 
much of the content. The “why” is rarely addressed and the most critical information is 
lost. 
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When I was going through my initial training just out of boot camp, I was told by 
my superiors to stay away from the predatory life insurance salesmen at the local mall. I 
had the SGLI, and there was no need for additional coverage. Now, to their credit, I was a 
young single Sailor whose only expenses were gas, car insurance, and a cell phone bill. I 
lived in the barracks and ate at the dining hall. My SGLI was allotted to my parents and 
my friends with the intent that they would have a legendary Las Vegas weekend in my 
honor. The only other times the SGLI was discussed in any form was direction to update 
beneficiaries. The recurring issue plaguing the forefront of the ranks were changes in 
dependency status through divorces, marriages, subsequent divorces, and maybe children. 
The focus was on who got the money, not the essence of the money. 
This mindset continued with me until three years ago when I spoke to a Gold Star 
military spouse who assessed the needs and requirements regarding how far the SGLI 
would go for her family. As a stay-at-home mother living in a high cost of living area, 
receiving the current maximum would have required the family to uproot and move to a 
significantly lower cost of living area—away from their community of peers and 
classmates, away from comfort and familiarity, to build a new life without their father. She 
and her husband sought out supplemental coverage and unfortunately it came into play 
after a tragic accident. But, because she planned for the worst, her children did not have to 
change schools, move away from their support network, or suffer a financial burden upon 
the death of their husband and father. 
It honestly never occurred to me that my family could face a similar burden in the 
event I died while on active duty. But, doing the math, $400,000 barely covered 5 years of 
base pay at my current rank, and it did not cover the cost of the house my husband and I 
purchased when we received orders to California. At that time, a typical single-family 
residence in San Diego County, CA, was $618,745. In 2020, the median home price was 
$703,181. Looking further back, the median home price for the area was $524,719 in 2005, 
and $325,570 in 2001 (Los Angeles Almanac, n.d.). 
Making the connection that the SGLI maximum was $400,000 when I enlisted in 
2006, I started piecing together the sobering fact of how much the SGLI was actually 
“worth.” Thinking back to those comments of perceived value by the services, the 
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arguments now had quantitative merit and proved that by not changing for inflation, a 
servicemember’s “worth” is correlated with the year the servicemember dies. 
My best hypothesis for the lack of change in over 16 years is that policymakers do 
not view it as beneficial for the VA and or Prudential. The significant jump in 2005 was 
enacted through the HEROES Act (S. Resolution 77, 2005). Servicemember sacrifices 
were constantly portrayed in the media. However, I doubt anyone in 2005 could have 
anticipated the tenure of the conflicts our country would endure. Most historical named 
conflicts lasted less than five years with the exception of the Vietnam War and the Persian 
Gulf War lasted less than one year (Defense Casualty Analysis System, n.d.). Nevertheless, 
16 years later servicemembers continue to die serving their country and are compensated 
at the same rate as 16 years prior. 
Taking this motivation for research, I sought to find a new feasible maximum life 
insurance amount for all servicemembers and personnel authorized to receive the current 
SGLI. In doing so, I researched: insurance providers; policymakers and key players; 
coverage considerations such as inflation, VSL, and annual income; contribution rates; 
beneficiary nuances; barriers to change; and alternative options. 
B. INSURANCE PROVIDERS 
Understanding the time, effort, and bureaucratic paperwork involved with 
government policies, I realized it would be egregious to completely change insurance 
providers for all uniformed personnel and I see no reason for it. I would only recommend 
other providers for coverage not sufficiently provided by the SGLI at the servicemember’s 
discretion. 
C. POLICYMAKERS AND KEY PLAYERS 
As with any major military policy, there are many decision makers regarding the 
SGLI program. The VA directly administers six life insurance programs and supervises 
three. The SGLI is one of the three supervised. The premiums for the VA’s group policy 
through Prudential are based on program experience and mutual agreements between them. 
Every month, the individual member’s premiums are deducted via the Defense Finance 
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and Accounting Service (DFAS) and are then paid to the VA, who then forwards the 
premiums to Prudential. Prudential records the premiums and maintains investment records 
independent of the VA. Reserves are held to account for claim fluctuations as required by 
law. The VA assesses Prudential’s reserve balance and if the contingency reserve balance 
is deemed excessive by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the excess funds are then 
transferred into the VA’s SGLI revolving fund account for investment into Treasury 
securities. Prudential records the insurance liabilities, not the VA, because Prudential 
assumes the risk of loss per the terms and conditions of the policy (United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs [VA], 2020a). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs updates 
the DOD of any changes, pending or approved to the life insurance programs. The 
Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commandant of the United States Coast Guard 
are tasked with developing associated regulatory guidance and ensuring their respective 
members regularly update their coverage (Department of Defense [DOD], 2017). I do not 
provide recommendations or analysis of the contingent reserve funds. I focus on 
contribution and payout estimates strictly at the servicemember level. 
There are other players involved to include Congressional resolution for ratification 
(S. Resolution 77, 2005), but ultimately, it is up to the servicemember to determine the 
appropriate amount of coverage that his or her beneficiaries would need. It is assumed the 
servicemember will prioritize his or her family’s well-being and always be prepared for the 
future. However, commands often intervene to ensure this paperwork is initiated and or 
updated regularly because family requirements can change drastically in a short period of 
time, and sometimes servicemembers need to be reminded of this. The SGLI is not a one-
size fits all solution. It is a strategic option that should be implemented and reassessed as 
appropriate, from both the policymakers as well as the end users. I do provide some 
baseline factors for consideration when encouraging servicemembers to determine 
appropriate amounts of coverage, but I do not intend to sway any individual’s ultimate 
decision. 
The United States Code calculates military pay increases based on the Employment 
Cost Index (ECI). The ECI is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to track 
businesses’ costs of labor. When the ECI increases, so does military pay. The President of 
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the United States may recommend an increase or decrease to this percentage. However, it 
would require ratification through Congress if it deviated from the ECI (Henig, 2010). 
Observing historical trends of previous increases, I used inflation and the CPI versus the 
ECI to justify increases to the SGLI maximum. 
D. COVERAGE 
Many life insurance policies incorporate eligibility factors that do not cover certain 
occupations or preexisting conditions. Often these include war clauses, military service 
restrictions, or exemptions that confine payout based on cause of death (Rose, 2019). While 
supplemental insurance providers with indemnity for aviation accidents may not be of 
interest to military pilots or aircrew, servicemembers in the medical field may consider 
them a viable option. When considering policies, it is important to read the fine print and 
ensure the coverage is realistic and applicable to optimally suit one’s needs. 
The SGLI does not typically require medical examinations to obtain coverage. 
Preexisting conditions of concern would most likely be vetted prior to joining a service. 
There have been instances however, of servicemembers reducing their coverage below the 
maximum amount and later wanting to return to the maximum. In these cases, additional 
medical questioning emerges (MilConnect, n.d.). 
Single servicemembers with little to no debt may not feel the need for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of coverage. This is their choice and it is perfectly acceptable. I would 
however, suggest they consider potential costs incurred by anyone who may have to travel 
to clean out their residence, retrieve their belongings, or organize a memorial service in a 
different location (Jowers, 2016). Acquaintances may also be deemed beneficiaries with 
the implication of care for beloved pets left behind. 
True, there are other benefits like the $100,000 death gratuity that are meant to 
cover the immediate costs incurred upon death, but it has a hierarchy of eligibility and may 
have limitations for those who are neither immediate family members nor executors 
(United States Department of Defense [DOD], n.d.). However, it is important to note this 
is separate from the SGLI. I do not intend to go into detail of benefits other than the SGLI, 
but mention death gratuity specifically because it fulfills some of the aforementioned 
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justifications for servicemembers to consider for life insurance. I reiterate that $400,000 or 
less through the SGLI may be perfectly acceptable for some, but not others. 
1. How Much Is Enough? 
a. Inflation Approach 
Historically, the SGLI maximums increased in roughly five-year increments 
(Callan et al., 2011). I do not know the rationalization for the uncharacteristic increases in 
1996 and 2005. I can only hypothesize it was for incentive purposes. In this research, I 
considered different methods to increase the maximum while integrating 5- year increases 
for the next 20 years. Ideally, the rates would adjust annually for inflation, but reconciling 
the amounts every five years to match inflation, or at least increase at any amount would 
still prove more beneficial than the status quo. Inflation is presented as a reasonable 
standard because it is a defining value of economics. 
b. Value of a Statistical Life Approach 
A study regarding combat casualties and servicemember compensation relating to 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by Armey et al. (2018) provided thorough insight on 
military VSL, particularly involving combat. It examined the effect of combat deployments 
to Iraq and Afghanistan on active duty casualties between 2001 and 2012. For their 
empirical analysis, they discussed different VSL estimates, and concluded $9.6 million was 
the appropriate VSL. They then used this value, multiplied by the casualty rate determined 
in their research for a value of $4,603 as an annual compensating wage differential (CWD). 
They then estimated an average of 5.7 months in-country for servicemembers deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan, so they then divided the CWD by 5.7, ultimately concluding that 
hazard pay should be increased from $225 to $808 for combat operations in these areas. 
Their control group was active duty casualty rates stateside (Armey et al., 2018). 
This literature was useful regarding the interpretation of casualty rates and 
identifying deficiencies regarding compensating the risks undertaken by servicemembers. 
I built upon it in a more general sense. I did not differentiate between overseas contingency 
operations and stateside deaths, nor did I differentiate between occupations or branch of 
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service because the SGLI does not pay out differently for cause or location of death. 
Although it does not require the deductible for combat related deaths, the premiums are 
still paid for via appropriations and therefore I hold deployability status constant in my 
calculations because the contributions continue, they are simply subsidized with active 
duty pay appropriations (S. Resolution 77, 2005). 
c. Income Approach 
Another academic study reviewed was from by Netzel and Bockenstedt (2019). It 
analyzed the background and effectiveness of the SGLI program with noted considerations 
for policy changes. More specifically, they too critiqued the stagnation of the SGLI 
maximum and held that inflation should be a justification for policy change. They further 
researched comparable life insurance recommendations and determined the Federal 
Employee Group Life Insurance policy advocated for 5 times one’s annual salary, in 
addition to other financial advisors who recommended 10 times one’s annual salary as 
coverage targets (Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019). 
One of their preliminary findings was that in 2005, the substantial increase to the 
SGLI essentially aligned the maximum authorized amount to the 5 times rule, with only 
less than 1 percent of servicemembers not sufficiently covered. Then by 2019, 6 percent of 
servicemembers were not sufficiently covered by the 5 times rule because of the imbalance 
of base pay increasing without increasing the $400,000 maximum (Netzel & Bockenstedt, 
2019). 
One of the limitations in their research was the lack of proprietary information from 
Prudential to accurately estimate monthly premiums for policies greater than $400,000 
(Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019). I started with the current contribution rate of $0.06 per 
$1,000 of coverage for my estimated proposal (VA, n.d.), then adjusted the contribution 
rates for further analysis using Microsoft Excel Solver. Netzel’s and Bockenstedt’s (2019) 
second and third limitations involved time in grade and marital status. For my income-
based approach, I used base pay rates alone. I did not factor time in grade, but I did factor 
in years of service. Promotion rates vary between different service branches and so I 
selected rough estimates for years of service for each rank with the understanding it was 
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for benchmark purposes only. If an E-5 servicemember looked at the chart and had more 
years of service, he or she would know that his or her pay would be greater. 
Servicemembers understand their timelines better than any chart I could provide in this 
research, but my goal was to start the conversation. Other pay considerations for 
dependents can be argued as compensated through the survivor benefit plan or other 
entitlements. I did not provide analysis for other survivorship entitlements in this research 
nor any other death benefit. 
2. Contribution Rates 
In July 2019, the SGLI contribution rate dropped from $0.07 to $0.06 for every 
$1,000 of coverage (VA, n.d.). The premium decreases were stated as in line with typical 
insurance industry practices as a response to reserve funds, the economy, and the number 
of death claims. Per the official VA blog: 
VA insurance continues to place the interests of service members first and 
foremost by keeping SGLI premiums as low as possible, while also 
maintaining the necessary reserve levels to ensure funds are available to pay 
claims and beneficiaries. (Hoffman, 2019, para. 3) 
I interpreted this as the SGLI change was on someone’s radar, but since it would 
take more than $100,000 to correct for inflation (BLS, n.d.) rather than acknowledging the 
shrinking worth of $400,000, the ultimate decision was to offer the $400,000 SGLI on sale. 
I believe an increase in the premium rate for a significant increase in coverage is 
justifiable. Researching the buying power of the 1965 SGLI maximum premium ($2 per 
month for $10,000) equates to $16.56 paid monthly for $82,779.11 worth of coverage in 
2021 dollars. Not considering inflation, but simply using the ratio of $1 for every $5,000 
worth of coverage as was the case in 1965, $80 would be paid monthly for $400,000 worth 
of coverage (BLS, n.d.; Callan et al., 2011). 
In the past, whenever the maximum amount increased, every servicemember at the 
maximum amount was automatically enrolled for the new maximum with automatic 
increased withdrawals for the new monthly premium. Those who were below the 
maximum, remained at their rate with premiums adjusting only if rates changed (VA, n.d.). 
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I recommend the contribution rate guidelines stay the same with rates changing as a blanket 
policy and not rated differently for varying levels of coverage. 
Researching the VA’s Annual Benefit Reports from fiscal years 1999 to 2019, 
statistics showed that of those eligible, an average of 98.7 percent of active duty personnel 
and 93.0 percent of reservists opted for the SGLI. This equated to an average of 96.8 
percent of servicemembers under the SGLI program. From fiscal years 2006 to 2019, after 
the SGLI increased to $400,000, an average of 99.1 percent of active duty and 92.8 percent 
of reservists opted for the SGLI. This equated to an average of 96.9 percent with some 
level of SGLI coverage. Of the active duty servicemembers with the SGLI between 2006 
and 2019, an average of 93.7 percent selected the $400,000 maximum and 6.3 percent 
selected a value between $50,000 and $350,000.7  Of the reserve personnel with the SGLI 
between 2006 and 2019, an average of 82.1 percent had the maximum $400,000 and 18.7 
percent opted for an amount between $50,000 and $350,000.8 In total, since the SGLI has 
been $400,000, an average of 89.6 percent of those with the SGLI opted for the maximum 
and 10.4 percent opted for an amount between $50,000 and $350,000. There was no data 
available indicating the percentage of personnel relative to the maximums prior to 2006 
(VA, 2020b). In my research, I applied these weighted averages when calculating 
contributions and payouts against end strength and death statistics. Appendix A shows 
these itemizations by individual years. 
E. BENEFICIARIES 
In 2005, the HEROES Act made it mandatory for married servicemembers to obtain 
spouse approval if the member elected for any amount lower than the maximum SGLI 
amount This literature reiterated the importance of beneficiaries and survivors having a 
voice in the life insurance determination process (S. Resolution 77, 2005). 
In an academic analysis from by Callan et al. (2011), they too analyzed the SGLI 
program, its history, current issues, and future implications. However, their paper was more 
 
7 The SGLI is only available in $50,000 increments (VA, n.d.). 
8 Noted total in excess of 100 percent due to source data rounding (VA, 2020b). 
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of an in-depth qualitative analysis regarding the SGLI program that was in response to a 
sensationalist article from Bloomberg, which cast Prudential in a negative light. There was 
some debate about the way Prudential was carrying out payments to beneficiaries because 
they were withholding payouts in turn for granting 0.5 percent interest on the amount 
withheld. However, their research concluded the article misled the public, and Prudential 
was acting legally and ethically fair. The authors did note that they were unable to 
differentiate between the nuances of revenues vice profits regarding Prudential’s 
accounting practices (Callan et al., 2011). 
Again, understanding there is a trusted method of collaboration between the VA 
and Prudential, I aim to hold those policies and procedures constant. I do recognize 
COVID-19 had and continues to have significant impacts on the economy and the financial 
positions of life insurance companies across the board. 
F. BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
1. Funding and Resources 
Researching the financial posture of Prudential showed they faced severe adversity 
from the Coronavirus pandemic. Not only was there an abnormal surge in insurance claims, 
but the 2020 stock market collapse negatively affected their investments. At the beginning 
of May 2020, shares had declined about 41 percent and their credit losses after taxes were 
forecast at about $2.4 billion over the next three years. In spite of this, Prudential claimed 
these losses as manageable (Nguyen, 2020). The 10K for Prudential is not expected for 
release until after completion of this research, but their 10Q from November 2020 gave 
insight into the impact of COVID-19 on their finances. They claimed the disruption in the 
global economy and troubled financial markets adversely impacted their cash flows, 
financial condition, and may continue to adversely impact future operations. The risks of 
their investments manifested in insurance liabilities, elevated mortality rates, as well as 
policyholder behavior. These trends are expected to continue, at least short-term. 
Prudential expects further impacts to their operations and continues to manage the impacts 
to the best of their ability. For the 3 months and 9 months leading up to the end of fiscal 
year 2020, Prudential reported net losses of $182 million and $2.759 billion, respectively, 
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blaming market conditions for negative results (Prudential Annuities Life Insurance 
Corporation, 2020). 
Understanding an SGLI increase will not be an overnight solution, I would presume 
that Prudential’s financial situation will continue to improve based on the overall stock 
market rebound since March 2020 and the growing distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. In 
addition, the VA continues to assist with reserve management and the ratio of 
servicemembers dying from COVID-19 is significantly less than the general population. 
That being said, I still sought out potential mitigating factors to determine statistical 
significance or correlation for insight on servicemember death fluctuations. With these 
answers, it could further help with resource planning. 
2. Motivation 
An additional explanation of the stagnated SGLI could simply be ignorance. The 
fact that it has not changed in 16 years due to lack of demand signal is certainly plausible. 
If no one has called out the stagnation, why should Prudential or the VA proactively seek 
to change policy. This research is intended to act as a demand signal. 
G. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS 
Understanding the likelihood of general ignorance on the nuances of life insurance, 
realistic education is conceivably the best option for optimizing benefits at the lowest cost. 
Servicemembers believing the SGLI through Prudential is the only option hinders the 
potential for servicemembers to obtain the coverage they actually desire or need. By 
assuming Prudential has a monopoly, other insurance suppliers are left unused. Without 
significant competition, Prudential maintains their current business practices without 
adjustment because there is no indicator for change. Servicemembers need to realize there 
is an oligopoly for military-centric life insurance plans. That other providers exist and will 
provide coverage for servicemembers at competitive rates (Air Force Sergeants 
Association [AFSA], 2021; American Armed Forces Mutual Aid Association [AAFMAA], 
2021; Armed Forces Benefit Association [AFBA], n.d.; Association of the United States 
Army [AUSA], 2021; Navy Mutual, 2021; United Services Automobile Association 
[USAA], 2021). 
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I acknowledge several other institutions that offer life insurance for 
servicemembers. This research makes no endorsement or guarantees of any particular one, 
and I do not and will not receive any compensation in any form from any provider. They 
were chosen at random by using internet searches for “military life insurance.” 
Understanding the variation in policies, member-specific eligibility, and varying rates and 
coverage amounts for the options out there, this research only lists providers for 
servicemembers to seek out the criteria that best suits their preferences. In addition, some 
of these providers use underwriters to handle the policies for the specific organizations and 
I do not want to provide inaccurate information that may sway a decision. To reiterate, this 
research does not pursue the changing of the SGLI provider and the alternatives are meant 
to be used as an educational reference point. When listed, they are in alphabetical order, 
not any particular form of ranking. 
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III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The overall data from this research spanned over the course of 1965 to 2021 with 
focus on specific timeframes noted accordingly. 
A. STEP ONE: DETERMINE WHAT THE SGLI MAXIMUM SHOULD BE 
With my primary argument centered on the effects of inflation, I obtained historical 
inflation rates from a personal finance website called The Balance, and used the CPI 
calculator from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (Amadeo, 2020; BLS, n.d.). I 
selected inflation as a factor because other servicemember benefits use inflation-based 
metrics to influence increases (Henig, 2010). For future projections, I used OLS regression 
values of historical SGLI maximums from 1965 carried forward. I also used a straight CPI 
estimate of 3 percent per year. Thirdly, I used a combination auto-regressive moving 
average process, both of the first order (ARMA (1,1)) for time series forecasting, then used 
data splitting to predict future United States inflation rates. For the third model, I used data 
from 1982 to 2020 to forecast future inflation rates through 2041. I selected this range of 
because the 1970s had an average inflation of 7.41 percent and 1980 reached 12.5 percent. 
These values significantly biased the forecasted estimates and so the data was left-censored 
to a more representative sample of expected inflation for the training and test sets (Amadeo, 
2020). 
Life insurance disbursements offer to beneficiaries what the member would have 
provided if they were still alive and earning income. The 5- and 10-year income 
equivalencies are not intended to be all-inclusive solutions, but rather a stopgap to allow 
the beneficiaries time to regain footing. These amounts vary by servicemember, not only 
by rank, but also with years of service. Because average time in grade varies between the 
different armed services, I used a single estimate for years of service to establish a reference 
point. Officer and enlisted base pay rates were obtained from the DFAS website. Warrant 
officers and elevated pay rates for officers with prior enlisted service in excess of five years 
were not factored into the analysis (Defense Finance and Accounting Service [DFAS], 
2021). 
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To determine housing price trends, I researched the 10 states with the highest 
population of servicemembers using data from DMDC.9 These 10 states equated to 49.1 
percent of the servicemembers stationed in the United States for January 2021 (Defense 
Manpower Data Center [DMDC], 2021a). I then researched median home values near 
military bases and compared the trends against the SGLI maximums between 2000 and 
2015. The SGLI maximum amounts are calculated by fiscal year and the median home 
prices are annual prices from March of the associated fiscal year (Anderson, 2015). 
B. STEP TWO: TREND ANALYSIS 
I analyzed total servicemember deaths and servicemember end strengths using data 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) from 1980 to 2020. Although eligible 
for the SGLI, data for the United States Coast Guard was not included in this analysis 
(DMDC, 2021b). To analyze empirical relationships between political party affiliations of 
the President, House Majority, and Senate Majority, I obtained data from official 
government websites (DMDC, 2021b; History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021a; History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021b; and United States Senate, 2021). Further details of trend variables 
are provided in chapter IV. I acknowledge determining the significance of each factor will 
not alone justify increasing the SGLI, but they may prove valuable insight. 
C. STEP THREE: FEASIBILITY DETERMINATION 
I derived historical SGLI contribution rates from multiple sources to include VA 
historical records, previous research, and official reports (Callan et al., 2011; Hoffman, 
2019; VA, 2020a; VA, 2020b; and). I derived servicemember enrollment data from VA 
Annual Benefit Reports (VA, 2020a). 
 
9 The top 10 states with the most servicemembers in January 2021 are from highest to lowest: 
California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Washington, Maryland, Hawaii, and South 
Carolina (DMDC, 2021a). 
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D. STEP FOUR: DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES 
Searching for military-friendly providers online, I identified American Armed 
Forces Mutual Aid Association (AAFMAA), Armed Forces Benefit Association (AFBA), 
Air Force Sergeants Association (AFSA), Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 
Navy Mutual, and United Services Automobile Association (USAA) as a few providers for 
optional life insurance policies. The variation in policies, eligibility, and other details are 
beyond the scope of this research and are subject to change. Rather than give sweeping 
generalizations of possibly dated information, these providers are listed for 
servicemembers to seek out the providers that suit their own preferences. Initial research 
showed stipulations for nicotine users and specific age groups. It is recommended that 
individual research be conducted by the servicemember to determine his or her own 
specific needs (AAFMA, 2021; AFBA, n.d.; AFSA, 2021; AUSA, 2021; Navy Mutual, 
2021; USAA, 2021). 
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IV. ANALYTICAL METHODS 
A. STEP ONE: DETERMINE WHAT THE SGLI MAXIMUM SHOULD BE 
1. OLS 
Using Equation 1, I regressed historical SGLI maximum values (sgli_max) over 
time (year), to estimate the average annual increase from 1965 to 2021. 
 sgli_maxt = βo + β1yeart + ε (1) 
The variable sgli_max indicates the value of the SGLI maximum for a given year 
(t). Figure 4 represents these values with navy-blue dots. The variable year indicates a 
given year, defined as a fiscal year, ending September 30 of the associated year. For years 
the maximum increased, there is no delineation of amounts over the course of the year. The 
calculations use the new maximum for the affiliated fiscal year, regardless of when the 
change actually occurred. The gold line in Figure 4 shows the estimate that for every 
additional year since 1965, the SGLI maximum increased an average of $9,247 (Callan et 
al., 2011). 
 
Figure 4. OLS Regression of SGLI Maximum Values by Year (1965–2021). 
Adapted from Callan et al. (2011). 
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Using strictly the OLS regression, the SGLI maximum for 2021 should be $433,929 
or $430,000 per my recommendation of rounding down to the nearest $5,000. To forecast 
into the future, I multiplied the β1 multiplier of $9,247 by 5 years and added it to $430,000. 
This gave a value of $476,235 for 2026. Rounding this value down to the nearest $5,000, 
I again added the 5-year β1 multiplier for a value of $521,235. I continued this process out 
to 2041. The first two rows of Table 1 show the OLS estimated maximum for 2021 and 
forecasted recommended values to 2041 (Callan et al., 2011). 
Table 1. Outlook of Estimated Maximums Using Various Inflation 
Forecasting Methods (2021–2041). Adapted from Amadeo (2020); 
BLS (n.d.); Callan et al. (2011). 
 
 
2. Inflation Adjusted 
To estimate an inflation-based value, I used the CPI calculator to estimate the 
buying power of $400,000 when the amount was established in September 2005, compared 
to the buying power in January 2021. This gave a value of $526,321 (BLS, n.d.). 
To forecast the CPI for the next 20 years, I used a constant estimate of 3 percent 
per year. After individually compounding the 3 percent CPI and adding that to the 
forecasted inflation, then rounding down to the nearest $5,000 every 5 years, I then used 
those rounded down amounts as the new baselines on which to further compound inflation 
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for subsequent intervals. The middle two rows of Table 1 show the CPI estimated 
maximum for 2021 and forecasted recommended values to 2041. 
I separately used the historical inflation rate calculated at the end of December 2005 
and multiplied it by $400,000, then multiplied that product by 0.25 to get an estimated 
inflation increase for just the last quarter of 2005 since the maximum changed to $400,000 
in September 2005. I then added that amount to $400,000 and compounded it for 
subsequent inflation through 2020. This method gave me a value of $533,061 for January 
2021. Figure 5 illustrates the inflation effects on $400,000. The horizontal axis start date is 
September 2005 and progresses in one-year increments. The horizontal navy-blue dots 
represent the unchanging $400,000 maximum. The upward-sloping green line represents 
the inflation corrected amounts for a given year since the increase, and the downward-
sloping red line represents the value of the $400,000 for the corresponding year (Amadeo, 
2020). 
 
Figure 5. Factoring Inflation Against $400,000 (2005–2021). Adapted from 
Amadeo (2020); Callan et al. (2011). 
To predict the United States inflation rate for the next 20 years, I used an 
ARMA(1,1) process for time series forecasting and then used data splitting to validate my 
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model. ARMA (1,1), predictes estimated inflation for the next 20 years to be between 0.44 
and 5.56 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval. The actual predicted values were 
all very close to 3.0 percent, but I used the actual predicted values in my inflation forecast 
calculations (Amadeo, 2020). Figure 6 illustrates the ARMA(1,1) predicted inflation rates 
with a purple line. The green line is the actual historic inflation rates since 1982, and the 
gray dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval of the predicted values. The 
bottom two rows of Table 1 show the estimated inflation corrected maximum for 2021 and 
forecasted recommended values to 2041. 
 
Figure 6. Historical and Predicted Inflation Rates Using ARMA(1,1) (1982–
2041). Adapted from Amadeo (2020). 
Figure 7 illustrates the values from Table 1. The gold dashed line is the estimated 
OLS value for a given year and the gold dots are the proposed OLS SGLI maximum 
estimates, rounded down to the nearest $5,000 at the noted 5-year intervals. The light blue 
dashed line and dots represent the similar values for the CPI estimates and recommended 
corrected maximums. The purple dashed line and dots are for the inflation corrected and 
forecasted estimates. (Amadeo, 2020 and Callan et al., 2011). Ideally, these rates would 
adjust annually for inflation, but a 5-year increase interval is also reminiscent of pre-2005 
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reformations (Callan et al., 2011). Figure 8 overlays the forecasted estimates beside the 
historical SGLI maximums represented by the navy-blue dots. 
 
Figure 7. Outlook of Estimated SGLI Maximums Using Various Inflation 
Forecasting Methods (2021–2041). Adapted from Amadeo (2020); BLS 
(n.d.); Callan et al. (2011). 
 
Figure 8. Historical SGLI Maximum Values Compared to the Outlook of 
Estimated SGLI Maximums (1965–2041). Adapted from Amadeo (2020); 
BLS (n.d.); Callan et al. (2011). 
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3. 5- and 10-Year Income 
Using data from DFAS, Table 1 from Appendix B shows the income-based analysis 
against the status quo by rank and estimated years in 2021. The 5- and 10-year multipliers 
determine the suggested coverage amounts recommended in Netzel’s and Bockenstedt’s 
(2019) research. The multiplier columns note if the values are more or less than the current 
SGLI maximum with the values in green if under the current maximum value and red if 
above. The top-off columns fill in the delta between the multipliers and $400,000. Green 
with parentheses shows the corresponding multiplier is below the current SGLI maximum 
by the amount in the parentheses. The red values without parentheses in the top-off 
columns indicate the amount required to reach the corresponding top-off. The final column 
shows the years of income $400,000 equates to for the different ranks and years of service 
(DFAS, 2021; Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019). Again, these values are for gauging purposes 
i.e., this table is not meant to imply a servicemember could spend 20 years receiving  
E-1 pay. 
4. Housing Trends 
Upon determining the top 10 states with the highest population of servicemembers 
using data from DMDC, I selected a base from California, North Carolina, and Washington 
to calculate home price trends. California was ranked number one for servicemember 
population, North Carolina was ranked number four, and Washington state was ranked 
number seven (DMDC, 2021a). I then researched median home values near the eight bases 
affiliated with San Diego, CA; Joint Base Bragg-Pope in North Carolina; and Joint Base 
Lewis-McChord in Washington state. Figure 9 shows the comparisons between the median 
home prices and the maximum SGLI values between 2000 and 2015. San Diego, CA bases 
consistently had median home prices above what the SGLI offered. North Carolina homes 
tracked relatively closely but stayed below, and Washington homes tracked relatively 
lower than the maximum SGLI amount (Anderson, 2015; DMDC, 2021a). 
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Figure 9. Median Home Price Trends for Selected Military Concentrated Areas 
(2000–2015). Adapted from Anderson (2015); Callan et al. (2011): 
DMDC (2021a). 
This information is useful because beneficiaries living in one location may or may not be 
able to afford to either stay in their preferred location, or move to an area of greater support 
following a tragedy based on the cost of living. I acknowledge the $400,000 will still cover 
mortgage or rent payments for years after a death, it just will not cover as much as the 
previous years did. 
B. STEP TWO: TREND ANALYSIS  
1. Empirical Relationships Using OLS and Logit 
I used Equations 2 and 3 for OLS and Logit modeling to examine empirical 
relationships between servicemember deaths, servicemember end strength totals, and 
partisan affiliations of government leadership (DMDC, 2021b; History, Art and Archives, 
United States House of Representatives, 2021a; History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives, 2021b; and United States Senate, 2021). 
 deatht =β0+β1SMEt+β2PresDt+β3HseDt+β4SenDt+εt (2) 
 ln(deatht)=βo+β1SMEt+β2PresDt+β3HseDt+β4SenDt+εt (3) 
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The subscript “t” (t) indicates a given year, defined as a fiscal year, ending on 
September 30 of the indicated year. The timeframe of this trend analysis is 1980 to 2020. 
When “years” are referred to for generalization purposes, this timeframe is implied unless 
otherwise specified. The dependent variable death (death) indicates the total number of 
servicemembers who died in a given fiscal year. This number includes all active duty, full 
time support, and National Guard and reservists who died while in an activated status for 
the noted timeframe. This number does not include United States Coast Guard members or 
any other personnel not in the armed services.10 The log of deaths (ln(death)) was used to 
extrapolate percentage point changes when used as the dependent variable. The variable 
servicemember end strength (SME) includes the total number of servicemembers, 
including all active duty, full time support, and full time equivalency of activated National 
Guard and reservists for the noted timeframe (DMDC, 2021b). President political 
affiliation (PresD) is a binomial variable: 1 if democrat, 0 if republican. House Majority 
political affiliation (HseD) is a binomial variable: 1 if the House Majority was democrat, 0 
if republican. Senate Majority political affiliation (SenD) is a binomial variable: 1 if the 
Senate Majority was democrat, 0 if republican. The variables PresD, HseD, and SenD, 
were not given in the original dataset, but were extrapolated from research and combined 
with the dataset (DMDC, 2021b; History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021a; United States House of Representatives, 2021b; and United States 
Senate, 2021). 
Table 2 displays the OLS regression estimates between servicemember deaths and 
the log of servicemember deaths. Equation 2 fit the data more closely to the regression line 
at 58.9 percent versus the 58.0 percent fit of equation 3, but these were not good 
representations of the data at a 95 percent confidence interval. The only statistically 
significant variable was SME (DMDC, 2021b; United States House of Representatives, 
2021a; History, Art and Archives, History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021b; and United States Senate, 2021). 
 
10 The armed services data provided includes the United States Army, United States Air Force, United 
States Navy, United States Marine Corps, affiliated full time support personnel, and activated full time 
equivalencies of reservists, and National Guard personnel (DMDC, 2021b). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables (1980–2020) 
 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021a); History, Art and Archives, United 
States House of Representatives (2021b); United States Senate (2021).  
2. Forecasting Servicemember Deaths 
Using the ARIMA time series analysis to predict servicemember deaths using the 
data from DMDC, I plotted the known servicemember deaths from 1980 to 2020. The auto-
correlation function (ACF) was stationary with no significant positive autocorrelation past 
lag 3 (it cut out at lag 3). It had a damp sinusoidal exponential decay and the partial auto-
correlation function (PACF) cut out at lag 1 (DMDC, 2021b). 
I therefore searched for a valid model using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). 
MA(3) had an AIC of 570.27 with 37 degrees of freedom. All parameter estimates were 
statistically significant while exhibiting stationary and uncorrelated ACF and PACF 
residuals. The residuals exhibited overall normality with only a minor skew, as well as 
constant variance (DMDC, 2021b). 
34 
Using data splitting, I withheld the test set of the last 13 years of data (2008 to 
2020), equating to 31.71 percent of the data. The MA(3) model validated appropriately and 
all parameter estimates were statistically significant with p-values less than 0.05. The 
model accurately predicted 12 of the 13 test set observations at a 95 percent confidence 
interval. Ultimately, this predicted between 757 and 2,596 servicemembers will die each 
year until 2041, at a 95 percent confidence interval. The forecasted predicted values are 
more precisely estimated to be 1,677 annual deaths. Based on recent trends, I would 
anticipate the average total to be less than 1,000. There have not been more than 1,600 
annual deaths since 2007. However, I used the predicted values as a conservative estimate 
for my analysis. Figure 10 depicts the results of my model with the actual annual 
servicemember deaths represented by the yellow line, the predicted servicemember deaths 
from my MA(3) model represented by the orange line, and the 95 percent confidence 
interval shown as the gray dashed lines (DMDC, 2021b). 
 
Figure 10. Historical and Predicted Servicemember Deaths Using MA(3) 
(1980–2041). Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
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C. STEP THREE: FEASIBILITY DETERMINATION 
To determine the feasibility of the proposed SGLI maximums, I started with debt-
to-income ratios of historical servicemember deaths against the historical weighted average 
contributions of those who elected for the SGLI. I conservatively assumed that every 
servicemember that died opted for the maximum SGLI for the given timeframe. Using 
historical averages, the weights I used were derived from an average of 96.8 percent of 
servicemembers opting for the SGLI between 2006 and 2019, and of that 96.8 percent, an 
average of 89.6 percent opting for the maximum amount, with 10.4 percent opting for an 
amount between $50,000 and $350,000 (VA, 2020b). 
To predict servicemember end strengths I used JMP time series forecasting in lieu 
of ARIMA modeling since no models would sufficiently validate. Figure 11 shows the 
predicted end strengths between 798,529 and 2,300,810 until 2041, representing a 95 
percent confidence interval (gray dashed line). The forecasted end strength is more 
precisely estimated between 1,493,721 and 1,549,669, assuming similar trends of those 
between 1980 to 2020 (DMDC, 2021b). 
 
Figure 11. Historical and Predicted Servicemember End Strengths Using JMP 
(1980–2041). Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
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I then used the predicted annual deaths and predicted servicemember end strengths 
to compare payout to contribution ratios from 1980 to 2041. The average debt-to-income 
ratio between 1980 and 2020 was 1.071. The average between 2005 and 2020, when the 
SGLI was $400,000 was 1.289. The breakdown of annual historical and forecast 
contribution to expenditure comparisons are in Appendix C. Understanding the SGLI is 
not a vacuum-entity of Prudential where death gratuities are only paid out from 
contributions, I held Prudential’s investments and other financial considerations constant 
over time and only sought to compare the ratios themselves (Callan et.al., 2011; DMDC, 
2021b; VA, 2020a). 
D. STEP FOUR: DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES 
Regardless of the outcome of this research, the data could and should be presented 
to servicemembers as a signal of the potential for requiring a top-off, depending on one’s 
needs. Table 1 of Appendix B in particular shows estimated income comparisons that 
would lay a foundation for discussion regarding how much is enough for each individual 
servicemember. Group life insurance policies can be a tremendous benefit with their 
blanket coverages. However, as Table 1 of Appendix B also shows, the blanket does not 
cover all members equally (DMDC, 2021b; Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019). 
AAFMAA, AFBA, AFSA, AUSA, Navy Mutual, and USAA are just some of the 
available providers for supplemental life insurance policies. These were noted as being 
appropriate for servicemembers, but there may still be other non-military providers that 
may still satisfy servicemember requirements. Again, rather than provide information full 
of stipulations, these providers are listed for servicemembers to seek out the providers that 
suit their preferences with the most current information (AAFMA, 2021; AFBA, n.d.; 
AFSA, 2021; AUSA, 2021; Navy Mutual, 2021; USAA, 2021). Similar to the financial 




A. STEP ONE: DETERMINE WHAT THE SGLI MAXIMUM SHOULD BE 
Figures 7 and  8 and Table 1 showed the results of different methods used to 
estimate potential values of an increased SGLI maximum with subsequent increases. 
Rounding down to the nearest $5,000, OLS regression estimated $430,000 as a 2021 
corrected maximum, increasing up to $605,000 in 2041 (Callan et al., 2011). CPI analysis 
estimated $525,000 as the 2021 corrected maximum, escalating to $930,000 in 2041. The 
inflation method corrected the maximum to $530,000 in 2021, with increases to $945,000 
in 2041 (Amadeo, 2020). 
Table 1 of Appendix B showed the breakdown of base pay multipliers and how 
many years of income $400,000 equates to for different ranks and years of service. The 
predicted increase to $525,000 shifts the balance of how many ranks fall under the 5- and 
10-year rules, but it is not a drastic correction. The totals may shift with subsequent 
increases, but that will depend on base pay increases as well. Allowing servicemembers to 
select their own amount using the suggested multipliers of 5- or 10-year base pay estimates 
would require the option to have coverage ranging from an estimated $100,000 to 
$1,000,000 for 5-year multipliers and $200,000 to $2,000,000 for 10-year multipliers in 
order to cover all paygrades using 2021 base pay rates (DFAS, 2021; DMDC, 2021b; 
Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019). 
The median home price analysis showed that it depends on where the beneficiary 
lives, wants to live, and the costs associated in order to determine sustainability of the SGLI 
payout. All factors that should be discussed with the servicemember when determining the 
appropriate amount of coverage. 
B. STEP TWO: TREND ANALYSIS 
1. Empirical Relationships Using OLS and Logit 
Appendix D provides statistical output to provide a more detailed evaluation of the 
process and methods used in trend analysis. The figures show what appear to be predictable 
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relationships between variables, but the tables show further analysis from which to base 
more factual analysis. 
Per the OLS conducted for Equations 2 and 3 and described in Table 2, the only 
statistically significant variable was servicemember end strength. This concludes for every 
servicemember end strength increase of 1,000 servicemembers for a given year, there will 
on average be an estimated one additional servicemember death. There were no statistically 
significant trends between servicemember deaths and the partisan affiliations of 
government leadership. Servicemember end strength was kept in the regression to mitigate 
for drastic fluctuations in manning levels by reducing omitted variable bias (DMDC, 
2021b; History, Art and Archives, United States House of Representatives, 2021a; History, 
Art and Archives, United States House of Representatives, 2021b; United States Senate, 
2021). 
Table 3 shows the results for the hypothesis tests to determine the likelihood of 
servicemember deaths increasing compared to the previous year based on the given 
variables. By rejecting the null, I determined a democratic President, House and Senate 
Majority all have the same likelihood of increasing servicemember deaths from the 
previous year. The pseudo R-squared value was 0.299, indicating a relatively good fit, 
however their likelihood of increasing servicemember deaths was overall low (DMDC, 
2021b; History, Art and Archives, United States House of Representatives, 2021a; History, 




Table 3. Hypothesis Test for Determining Likelihoods of Predicting 
Servicemember Death Increases 
 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021a); History, Art and Archives, United 
States House of Representatives (2021b); United States Senate (2021).  
Table 4 shows the predicted probabilities of servicemember deaths increasing 
compared to the previous year for House and Senate Majorities, by whether there  
was a republican or democrat President. All options were statistically significant at a  
95 percent confidence interval with the exception of a democratic president with a 
republican House and Democratic Senate Majority. Again, the pseudo R-squared value was 
0.299, indicating a relatively good fit (DMDC, 2021b; History, Art and Archives, United 
States House of Representatives, 2021a; History, Art and Archives, United States House 
of Representatives, 2021b; United States Senate, 2021). 
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Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Servicemember Deaths Increasing from 
the Previous Year Based Presidential Party 
 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021a); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021b); United States Senate (2021). 
Table 5 shows the odds ratios for the effects of servicemember end strength, and 
political party affiliations of government leadership on the likelihood of servicemember 
deaths increasing compared to the previous year. A democratic House Majority was the 
only statistically significant variable, but the pseudo R-squared value was 0.1901, 
indicating a less than ideal fit, therefore I would not consider these ratios to be valid 
predictors (DMDC, 2021b; History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021a; History, Art and Archives, United States House of 
Representatives, 2021b; United States Senate, 2021). 
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Table 5. Odds Ratios of End Strength and Partisan Government Leadership 
on the Likelihood of Servicemember Deaths Increasing from 
the Previous Year 
 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021a); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021b); United States Senate (2021). 
2. Forecasting Servicemember Deaths 
Ideally the accuracy of the forecasting models would have been greater than 95 
percent and the MA(3) model used to predict servicemember deaths had a 92.3 percent 
forecasting accuracy. Again, there are many factors that influence the likelihood of 
servicemember deaths that span beyond the capabilities of this research and so although 
not optimal, this model was used with a 95 percent confidence interval to provide at least 
some level of reference for ex post analysis. The model predicted between 757 and 2,596 
servicemembers will die each year until 2041. The forecasted predicted values averaged 
closer to 1,677 annual deaths (DMDC, 2021b). 
C. STEP THREE: FEASIBILITY DETERMINATION 
It is possible to maintain levels of debt-to-income ratios similar to historic trends. 
It would however, require increasing contributions from servicemembers with each 
subsequent increase. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
1. Step One: Determine what the SGLI Maximum Should Be 
Depending on every servicemember’s individual situation, supplemental insurance 
may be required at any time, regardless of rank or time in grade. The tables throughout this 
thesis and appendices were provided to show a snapshot of  present-day estimates and other 
considerations. This is where servicemember education becomes important. Costs of living 
vary by state and five years of income may be more than adequate if the beneficiary has a 
degree, stable income, or decides to live in a low cost of living area. 
2. Step Two: Trend Analysis 
My Logit model correctly predicted 75.00 percent of the observations and the rest 
of the analyses proved low consistency of statistical significance and reliability pertaining 
to predictors. There could be measurement error based on the specific dates of death and 
Presidential terms. This research does not attempt to identify specific dates of 
servicemember deaths, and Presidential terms were calculated from the years of term 
majority. House and Senate Majorities were calculated using term majority dates from 
session records. In addition, multicollinearity may be present due to lasting effects of 
contingency operations inherited across Presidential terms and the fact that between 1980 
and 2020, there were republican Presidents for an average of 59 percent of the time. This 
leads me to believe that checks and balances have worked to ensure that no single 
omnipotent entity can increase servicemember deaths, which should be reassuring to a life 
insurance provider. 
As previously mentioned, the data for this analysis is not ideal. To have a better 
overall picture dates could be honed in to a scale smaller than annually, and additional 
factors could be analyzed. Named conflicts and overseas contingency operations were 
considered for this research, but the amount of collinearity was too high with multiple 
operations overlapping time-wise and the DMDC data not specifying such a level of 
specificity for casualty data. In addition, there are other eligible entities who may receive 
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SGLI payouts that were not considered in this dataset. United States Coast Guard data was 
not included in this analysis, neither was commissioned members of the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States Public Health Service (USPHS), 
and midshipmen of service academies. Their data trends could also affect SGLI payout to 
contribution ratios. 
For this analysis, the goal was to identify blatant predictors aside from large scale 
conflicts. Researching trends in cause of death may also provide insight for certain 
predictors, but again, that is beyond the scope of this research. 
In spite of not accurately forecasting servicemember death trends, I would not 
necessarily discount the forecasting model based solely on this analysis. Using a data set 
with only 41 observations is not optimal for accurate predictions, especially when operating 
right at the edge of standards for data splitting. Of greater note is the fact that there were 
significant events that biased the data. Years of egregious inflation rates in excess of 6 
percent and the years before and after September 11, 2001 resulted in trends that were 
challenging to account for. As time passes, more observations will provide more data points 
from which to predict. 
3. Step Three: Feasibility Determination 
Without conducting surveys of personnel, it is unknown as to the buy-in of 
servicemembers to the increased contributions that will inevitably come with increased 
maximum amounts. Historic trends were used for this analysis and the predicted confidence 
intervals encompassed a substantial range of possibilities. 
Considering these analyses, as well as Prudential’s disclosed status regarding 
COVID-19, I would still recommend increasing the SGLI maximum amount at this time. I 
would expect policymakers to reject the idea based on the inability to predict future 
servicemember deaths and the concern over funding. This research did show that 
incremental increases would create more financial strain as time progressed assuming a 
conservatively high average of servicemember deaths. However, any increase in the near 
future and with or without incremental increases is still better than the status quo. 
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4. Step Four: Discuss Alternatives 
Ultimately it should be up to the servicemember to ensure his or her beneficiaries 
are prepared in case of a catastrophic event. However, they require the tools to make these 
decisions. Educating servicemembers on what to consider and how to approach life 
insurance will not have the same gravitational effect on everyone, but to those who receive 
the compensation, it will matter to them. It is possible not everyone will opt for a new 
increased maximum amount, but based off of historical trends, I would expect greater than 
85 percent is likely (VA, 2020b). I acknowledge that some survivors will choose to remain 
in a high cost of living area, while others would prefer their support network at a lower 
cost of living area. I also acknowledge the SGLI payout may not even go towards housing 
at all. There are countless factors to consider, but money should not drive the decision to 
be emotionally supported or not. 
Even if all attempts of an increase are rejected, and no statement for intent of 
increasing the maximum is ever made, I would hope the education for financial 
responsibility and awareness for our servicemembers improves and that those who truly 
need it seek it out before it is too late. 
Death is a difficult topic to discuss openly. Among my colleagues, I encountered 
members who never took this information seriously. For “next of kin” they would write 
fictional characters and make other off the wall comments on official casualty related 
documents. Unfortunately, many had the mindset that once they died, whatever issues were 
left would not be their problem anymore. So, why bother? 
As beneficial as it could be, I am not recommending a formal training session 
annually, but a simplified flyer or quick reference illustrating the differences in rank and 
how far $400,000 can actually go may provide tremendous context. When a member 
checks in or out of a command, has a change in family status, or promotes to a higher rank, 
he or she could look at the sheet and be reminded that the proportionate amount will shift 
and enable him or her to adjust the SGLI benefits as desired. 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nevertheless, I therefore recommend the SGLI maximum from Prudential be 
increased at the very least to $525,000 and increased to the following amounts as shown in 
Table 6. The contribution rates need not be followed, they were simply used to determine 
feasibility. I am sure the VA and Prudential have better analysts to determine true 
feasibility. I focused on the conservative ratio since 1980, whereas the more recent ratio 
appears far more affordable and appealing from the servicemember perspective. For 
clarification, I do not intend for this to be a tremendous knee-jerk reaction that stagnates 
similar to 2005. Yes, this would increase the SGLI maximum $125,000 similar to the 
$150,000 raise in 2005, but that $150,000 raise came 5 years, not 16 years after the previous 
increase (Callan et al., 2011). Increasing the SGLI maximum amount would also send a 
message to servicemembers, the argument of “feeling valued” may be addressed on some 
level. Recruiting and retention may also see greater improvements. Regardless, our 
servicemembers deserve to be compensated more appropriately for deaths that occur in the 
line of duty. 
Table 6. Proposed SGLI Increase for 2021–2041 with Contribution Options. 
Adapted from Callan et al. (2011); DMDC (2021b); VA (2020b). 
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APPENDIX A.  SGLI ELECTION DATA  
Table 7. Servicemember Election of SGLI (1999–2019). Adapted from VA (2020b). 
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Table 8. Servicemember Election of Different Coverage Amounts (2006–2019). Adapted from VA (2020b). 
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APPENDIX B.  INCOME BASED ANALYSIS OF STATUS QUO 
Table 9. 2021 Base Pay Comparisons for E-1 to O-10 Against the Current SGLI 
Maximum. Adapted from DFAS (2021); Netzel and Bockenstedt (2019). 
 
The 5- and 10-year multipliers determine the suggested coverage amounts recommended in Netzel’s and 
Bockenstedt’s (2019) research. The multiplier columns note if the values are more or less than the current 
SGLI maximum with the values in green if under the current maximum value and red if above. The top-off 
columns fill in the delta between the multipliers and $400,000. Green with parentheses shows the 
corresponding multiplier is below the current SGLI maximum by the amount in the parentheses. The red 
values without parentheses in the top-off columns indicate the amount required to reach the corresponding 
top-off. The final column shows the years of income $400,000 equates to for the different ranks and years 
of service (DFAS, 2021; Netzel & Bockenstedt, 2019) 
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APPENDIX C.  HISTORICAL AND FORECAST 
DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIOS 
Table 10. Historical Expenditure to Contribution Ratios Using Historical 
Contribution Rates (1980–2020). Adapted from Callan et al. (2011); 
DMDC (2021b); VA (2020b). 
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Table 11. OLS Forecast Expenditure to Contribution Ratios Using 
(1980–2020) and (2005–2020) Ratios. Adapted from Callan et al. (2011); 
DMDC (2021b); VA (2020b). 
 
Table 12. CPI Forecast Expenditure to Contribution Ratios Using (1980–
2020) and (2005-2020) Ratios. Adapted from Callan et al. (2011); DMDC 
(2021b); VA (2020b). 
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Table 13. Inflation Forecast Expenditure to Contribution Ratios Using 
(1980–2020) and (2005–2020) Ratios. Adapted from Callan et al. (2011); 
DMDC (2021b); VA (2020b). 
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APPENDIX D.  TREND ANALYSIS FIGURES AND TABLES 
A. TREND ANALYSIS FIGURES 
 
Historical servicemember deaths from 1980 to 2020. The left red line 
indicates fiscal year 2001. The right red line indicates fiscal year 2005, 
the year the SGLI increased to $400,000. 
Figure 12. Annual Servicemember Deaths (1980–2020).  
Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
 
Historical servicemember end strength from 1980 to 2020. The red lines 
indicate 2001 and 2005, respectively. 
Figure 13. Total End Strength Per Fiscal Year (1980–2020).  
Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
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Historical servicemember deaths overlaid on total end strength for 1980 
to 2020. The red lines indicate 2001 and 2005, respectively. 
Figure 14. Annual Servicemember Deaths and Total End Strengths (1980–2020). 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
 
Correlation between servicemember deaths and end strength for a given 
year. On average, for every 1,000 servicemember end strength increase, 
an average of 1 additional servicemember dies for a given year. This 
estimation is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00 with the model 
describing roughly 55 percent of the data. 
Figure 15. Servicemember Deaths Compared to End Strength (1980–2020). 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b). 
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B. ANNUAL DEATHS COMPARED TO END STRENGTH FOR PARTISAN 
GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP 
 
Total servicemember deaths per year compared to servicemember end 
strength when there was a republican President (left), compared to a 
democratic President (right). 
Figure 17. Servicemember Deaths Compared to End Strength for Republican and 
Democratic Presidencies (1980-2020). Adapted from DMDC (2021b); 
History, Art and Archives, United States House of Representatives (2021b). 
 
Total servicemember deaths per year compared to servicemember end 
strength when there was a republican House Majority (left) compared to 
a democratic House Majority (right). 
Figure 18. Servicemember Deaths Compared to End Strength for Republican and 
Democratic House Majorities (1980–2020). Adapted from DMDC (2021b); 
History, Art and Archives, United States House of Representatives (2021a). 
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Total servicemember deaths per year compared to servicemember end 
strength when there was a republican Senate Majority (left) compared to 
a democratic Senate Majority (right). 
Figure 19. Servicemember Deaths Compared to End Strength Per Senate Majorities 
(1980–2020). Adapted from DMDC (2021b); United States Senate (2021). 
C. DEATHS PER YEAR FOR PARTISAN GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP 
 
Total servicemember deaths per fiscal year when there was a republican 
President (left) compared to a democratic President (right). 
Figure 20. Annual Servicemember Deaths For Republican and Democratic 
Presidents (1980-2020). Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and 
Archives, United States House of Representatives (2021b). 
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Total servicemember deaths per fiscal year when there was a republican 
House Majority (left) compared to a democratic House Majority (right). 
Figure 21. Annual Servicemember Deaths Per House Majorities (1980–2020). 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States 
House of Representatives (2021a). 
 
Total servicemember deaths per fiscal year when there was a republican 
Senate Majority (left) compared to a democratic Senate Majority (right). 
Figure 22. Annual Servicemember Deaths Per Senate Majorities (1980–2020). 
Adapted from DMDC (2021b); United States Senate (2021). 
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D. AVERAGE ANNUAL DEATHS PER PARTISAN GOVERNMENT 
LEADERSHIP 
 
Average annual servicemember deaths with a republican President (left) 
compared to a democratic President (right), with a 95 percent confidence 
interval. 
Figure 23. Average Servicemember Deaths Per President’s Political Affiliation. 
Adapted by DMDC (2021b); History, Art and Archives, United States House 
of Representatives (2021b). 
 
Average annual servicemember deaths with a republican House Majority 
(left) compared to a democrat House Majority (right), with a 95 percent 
confidence interval. 
Figure 24. Average Servicemember Deaths Per House Majority. Adapted by 




Average annual servicemember deaths with a republican Senate Majority 
(left) compared to a democrat Senate Majority (right), with a 95 percent 
confidence interval. 
Figure 25. Average Servicemember Deaths Per Senate Majority. Adapted by 
DMDC (2021b); United States Senate (2021).  
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